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TOWARDS A BALANCED APPROACH FOR THE
PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN SACRED SITES
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
Protection of "sacred sites" is very important to Native American religious
practitioners because it is intrinsically tied to the survival of their cultures, and
therefore to their survival as distinct peoples. The Supreme Court in Oregon v.
Smith held that rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, was the appropriate
level of judicial review when evaluating the constitutionality of neutral laws of
general applicability even when these laws impacted one's ability to practice a
religion. Reacting to the decision, Congress enacted the Relgious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated the strict scrutiny test for challenges to
neutral laws of general applicability alleged to have substantially burdened free
exercise rights. In a controversial 2008 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a
"substantial burden" under RFRA is only imposed when individuals are either
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs or forced to choose between following
the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit. In all likelihood,
such a narrow definition of substantial burden will prevent Native American
practitioners from successfully invoking RFRA to protect their sacred sites.
In this Article, Ifirst explore whether the Ninth Circuit's definition of "substantial
burden" is mandated under RFRA. To a large degree, this question comes down to
whether a pre-RFRA Supreme Court decision, Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery, precludes courts from adopting a broader definition of what is a
substantial burden under RFRA. Although this Article contends that neither Lyng
nor RFRA precludes the adoption of a broader definition of "substantial burden,"
the Article nevertheless acknowledges that many judges may disagree. The Article
therefore recommends enactment of a legislative solution.
The legislation proposed is a compromise between the needs of Indian religious
practitioners and those who argue that rel~gious practitioners should not have a veto
over how federal lands are used and developed. Therefore, in return for the
broadening of what can constitute a substantial burden on free exercise rights, the
Article recommends the adoption of an intermediate type of judicial scrutiny. The
Article also discusses ways to limit what can be considered sacred sites under the
legislation so as to ensure protection of sites vital to Native American culture and
religion without unnecessarily burdening federal management offederal lands.
* SJ. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah SJ. Quinney College of Law. I
want to thank professors Wayne McCormack and Frank Ravitch for reading and analyzing
earlier drafts of this Article.Thanks also to Kristen Carpenter and Rick Collins (and all the
participants) for organizing a work-in-progress conference at the University of Colorado
School of Law where an earlier draft of this Article could be discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Native American religions are land based. There are certain geo-
graphical sites or physical formations that are held to be "sacred" as an
integral part of the religion. Religious practitioners therefore hold certain
ceremonies, collect plants, or make pilgrimages to such places on recur-
ring bases.' These places used to be located within the tribes' ancestral
territories, but as a result of conquest, land cessions, and other historical
events, many sacred sites are now located on federal land. Though federal
managers have at times accommodated Indian religious practitioners' in-
terests in protecting these sites,2 there have also been times when federal
management of those sites has conflicted with Native religions. I have in
previous writings joined others in expressing the view that among all the
Native American cultural and religious issues, protection of sacred sites is
the one area where Native Americans have enjoyed by far the least suc-
cess.' This Article explores what can be done to help Native religious
practitioners more successfully assert their interests and rights in these
sites. Some scholars have made coherent and persuasive arguments about
expanding the law of property to defend Native American sacred sites.'
1. See generally WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR 325-56
(2010).
2. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt, 2 F Supp. 2d 1448 (D.Wyo. 1998);
Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002); see also Mar-
tin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use Designation to Protect Tribal
Cultural and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585 (2008), Mary
Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements Between Native American Tribes and the
US. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal Self-Governance Act, 31 HAv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 475, 488-93 (2007).
3. See Jessica M. Wiles, Have American Indians Been Written Out of the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act?, 71 MoNr. L. REV. 471, 497-98 (2010); Rayanne J. Griffin, Sacred Site
Protection Against a Backdrop of Religious Intolerance, 31 TULSA L.J. 395 (1995); John Rhodes,
An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52 MowT. L. REV. 13, 23
(1991); Alex TallchiefSkibine, Culture Talk or Culture War in Federal Indian Law, 45 TULSA L.
REV. 89, 100-07 (2009).
4. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases:Asserting
A Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1065-67 (2005); Kevin J.
Worthen, Protecting the Sacred Sites of Indigenous People in US. Courts: Reconciling Native
American Religion and the Right to Exclude, 13 ST.THOMAS L. REV. 239 (2000).
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Others have looked to the Executive Branch and some administrative-
type remedies. While these new theories are promising-and some have
met with substantial success 6-the purpose of this Article is to evaluate
legal protections given to Native American sacred sites under current free
exercise jurisprudence and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).' RFRA re-imposed the strict scrutiny test as it was used before
Employment Division v. Smith, a case in which the Supreme Court held that
strict scrutiny was no longer applicable when the challenge was to a neu-
tral law of general applicability which only incidentally substantially
burdened someone's religion.' Under RFRA, the government cannot
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion unless it demonstrates
that it is protecting a compelling governmental interest by the least re-
strictive means.'
In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, Indian tribes were at-
tempting to prevent the Forest Service from authorizing the use of
artificial snow made from recycled sewage water at a ski resort located in
Arizona within the San Francisco Peaks, an area held sacred by many
tribes. 0 The Ninth Circuit, en banc, reversed a panel decision and held
that in order to show that their free exercise rights have been substantially
burdened under RFRA, religious practitioners attempting to protect sa-
cred sites located on federal land must show that the government has
either coerced them to do something against their religion or that the
government has denied them a benefit because they opted to practice
their religion." As a result, the tribes lost their case. There is now a
5. See, e.g., Michelle Kay Albert, Obligations and Opportunities to Protect Native Ameri-
can Sacred Sites Located on Public Lands, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 479 (2009); Marren
Sanders, Ecosystem Co-Management Agreements: A Study of Nation Building or a Lesson on
Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty, 15 BuFF. ENVTL. L.J. 97 (2007-08), Marcia Yablon, Property
Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on
Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Access Fund v. U.S. Dept. ofAgriculture, 499 E3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007);
see also Zuni Tribe v. Platt, 730 F Supp 318 (D. Ariz. 1990) (holding that the Zuni tribe
had established a prescriptive easement over private lands that had to be crossed in order
to reach tribal sacred sites).
7. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000bb (2006).
8. Emp't Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
10. 535 F3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
11. Id. at 1069-70. As the Ninth Circuit put it, "a 'substantial burden' is imposed
only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion
and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their reli-
gious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder)." For a brief but witty
criticism of this approach, see Thomas F King, Commentary: What Burdens Religion? Musings
on Tivo Recent Cases Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 13 GREAT
PLAINs NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 1-3 (2010) (observing that under this interpretation of
RFRA neither Nebuchadnezzar, who destroyed Solomon's temple before taking the Jews
into captivity to Babylon, nor Titus, the Roman emperor who dispersed the Jews
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conflict among the federal circuit courts concerning what constitutes a
"substantial burden" under RFRA. In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the
Fourth and D.C. Circuits also have adopted a narrow definition of sub-
stantial burden.12 However, in Comanche Nation v. United States, a federal
district court stated that "RFRA does not define 'substantial burden.' ""
The Tenth Circuit has defined the term by stating that a governmental
action that substantially burdens a religious exercise is one that must "sig-
nificantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression" or "deny reasonable
opportunities to engage in religious activities."" The Tenth Circuit's posi-
tion seems to be followed in the Eighth Circuit.'" Others, like the Seventh
Circuit, also seem to be more in line with this view.'6
One of the questions examined in this Article is whether the Ninth
Circuit's definition of "substantial burden" is mandated under RFRA.
More precisely, the question is whether a pre-RFRA decision, Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery," precludes courts from adopting a different
definition of substantial burden when deciding a case under RFRA. In
Lyng, Native religious practitioners were attempting to prevent the Unit-
ed States Forest Service from completing a timber logging road, the G-O
road, through an area held sacred to the Tolowa,Yurok, and Karuk Indian
tribes.'9 As further explained below, even though the government's interest
did not seem compelling and even though the Court acknowledged that
completion of the road would "virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability to
practice their religion,"20 the Court rejected the tribes' free exercise claim,
stating that "the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that
could justify upholding respondents' legal claims."2' In doing so, the Court
seemed to have adopted a very narrow definition of substantial burden,
one that would in fact totally preclude Indian tribes from using RFRA to
protect sacred sites.
throughout the Mediterranean world, could be found guilty of violating the Jews' reli-
gious rights).
12. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F3d 12, 15-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Goodall v. Staf-
ford County, 60 E3d 168, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1995).
13. No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008WL 4426621, at *3 (WD. Okla. Sept. 23,2008).
14. Id. (citing Thiry v. Carlson, 78 E3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)).
15. See In reYoung, 82 F3d 1407, 1418-19 (8th Cir. 1996).
16. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. Chicago, 342 F3d 752, 761 (7th Cit.
2003) (stating that a "regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is
one that necessarily bears a direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering
religious exercise . .. effectively impracticable").
17. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
18. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: Thme Problem of Burdens on tie Free Exercise of
Relgion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989) for a discussion of substantial burdens on free exer-
cise cases.
19. 485 U.S. at 442-44.
20. Id. at 451.
21. Id. at 452.
272 [OL. 17:269
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Some have argued that the lack of support for protecting sacred sites
stems from a lack of understanding Indian religions. 22 While the degree of
understanding among judges and justices may vary, one cannot deny a
certain Western-centered aspect in the Lyng Court's discussion of the bur-
den on Native American practitioners. Such views, which are also
reflected in both the district court and the Ninth Circuit en banc deci-
sions in Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, suggest a lack of
understanding about why sacred sites are important to Indian people.
Thus, even though the Lyng Court claimed that it was willing to assume
that the G-O Road would destroy the Indians' ability to practice their
religion, the Court also stated,"[wihatever may be the exact line between
unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the le-
gitimate conduct by the government of its own affairs, the location of the
line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development."23 The Court added, "[a] broad
range of government activities-from social welfare programs to foreign
aid to conservation projects-will always be considered essential to the
spiritual well-being of some citizens." 24 justice O'Connor also stated that the
"government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires."25
Statements such as these seem to equate Indians' religious exercises
at sacred sites with Western yoga-like practices. In other words, this view
portrays Native religious activities at sacred sites as only about spiritual
peace of mind.While such benefits are certainly part of the practice, they
do not go to the heart of why these sacred places are important to Indian
people or why management practices like cutting down trees and spilling
recycled sewage water on sacred land are extremely disturbing to many
Indian tribes. 26 The importance of sacred sites to Indian tribes and Native
practitioners is less about individual spiritual development and more
about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal people." The preser-
vation of these sites as well as tribal people's ability to practice their
religion there is intrinsically related to the survival of tribes as both
22. See Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Develop-
ment of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449-53, 1459-64 (1985); John Rhodes, An
American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52 MoNr. L. REV. 13, 16-17,
(1991); Bryan J. Rose, Note, A judicial Dilenuna: Indian Religion, Indian Land, and the Reli-
gion Clauses, 7 VA.J. So. PoLIcY & L. 103, 104-05 (1999).
23. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. On the importance of Sacred Sites to Indian people, see ECHO-HAWK, Supra
note 1, at 237-358.
27. See Jessica M. Erickson, Making Live and Letting Die: The Biopolitical Effect of Nav-
ajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 463, 471-74 (2010).
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cultural28 and self-governing entities. 29 As stated in a mandated report
submitted to Congress by the Department of the Interior,
[t]he Native peoples of this country believe that certain areas
of land are holy. These lands may be sacred, for example, be-
cause .. . they contain specific natural products, because they
are the dwelling place or embodiment of spiritual beings, be-
cause they surround or contain burial grounds or because they
are sites conducive to communicating with spiritual beings.
There are specific religious beliefs regarding each sacred site
which form the basis for religious laws governing the site.3 0
This is not only a matter of individual spiritual development. It is about
the potential destruction of a people and their culture. Although the right
to cultural identity is not a recognized constitutional right in the United
States, there is an emerging consensus in international forums that it
should be a norm of international human rights law.3 1
Concluding that Lyng may prevent the adoption of a broader defini-
tion of "substantial burden," this Article recommends amending the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)3 2 to achieve a more
balanced approach for the protection of sacred sites. Of course, the free
exercise clause remains a viable alternative if the law being challenged is
not neutral in that it discriminates against Indian religions33 or if Indian
complainants can somehow invoke the so-called hybrid theory by claim-
ing that protection of sacred sites involves not only a religious right but
28. See David Bogen & Leslie F. Goldstein, Culture, Religion, and Indigenous People, 69
MD. L. REv. 48, 56-57 (2009).
29. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 191,
205-06 (2001); Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Se!f-Deternination: The Makah Indian
Tribe Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 165 (2000-01).
30. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PL. 95-341, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
ACT REPORT 52 (1979).
31. See Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and
Continuing Challenges, 22 Eun. J. Irrr'L L. 121, 129 (2011) (arguing that the threat to the
survival of indigenous peoples' culture is what has motivated most of the international
declarations adopted by the United Nations concerning the rights of Indigenous peoples);
see also Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 299, 332-46 (2002) (suggesting that there should be a
fundamental right to cultural integrity under United States law).
32. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§5 1996-1996a (2006)).
33. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F3d 359 (3rd Cit. 1999); see also Kenneth
D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Ap-
plicability in Current Free Exercise jurisprudence, 77 TEx. L. REV. 753 (1999) (arguing that
since the Court is unlikely to overturn or modify Oregon v. Smith, free exercise advocates
should focus on finding exceptions to Smith as was done in Church of the Lukumi Babalu).
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another fundamental right as well." Though these are both possible alter-
natives, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I gives a brief back-
ground on Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service"s and the statutory
interpretation issues relating to RFRA faced by the court in that case.
Part II debates whether Lyng precludes the adoption of a broader view of
what is a "substantial burden" when litigating under RFRA. Part III pro-
poses an amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act that
would acknowledge that Federal management of sacred sites can impose
substantial burdens on Native religions even if those burdens do not in-
volve coercion/denial of governmental benefits. Part III also criticizes the
current version of RFRA and argues that rather than imposing strict
scrutiny along with a narrow definition of substantial burden, a better so-
lution would adopt a type of intermediate scrutiny with a broader
definition of substantial burden.
1. RFRA AND THE SAN FRANcisco PEAKs LITIGATION
Lyng is the only Supreme Court decision involving Indian sacred
sites. Before Lyng, Native American religious practitioners and Indian
tribes had not met with any success in the lower courts when invoking
the free exercise clause to protect their sacred sites from detrimental gov-
ernmental actions. Lyng, of course, further foreclosed any chances of
success. 6 In some of these pre-Lyng cases, the Indians lost because the
court found that the governmental actions at issue did not interfere with a
central aspect of Native religions." In other cases, courts held that the
burdens on religious practitioners were either insufficient8 or were out-
weighed by more compelling governmental interests.39 Thus, sacred sites
advocates thought the enactment of RFRA in 1993 could only bring
welcome changes for Indian tribes in their quest to protect sacred sites.
The Ninth Circuit en banc decision in the San Francisco Peaks litigationo
34. However, some scholars have found this new hybrid theory, apparently first
announced in Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990), was flawed and not supported by precedent. See Michael W McConnell, Free Exer-
cise Revisionismn and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,1121-22 (1990).
35. 535 E3d 1058 (2008).
36. See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F Supp. 1471, 1485 (1990); United
States v. Means, 858 E2d 404, 407 (8th Cir. 1988).
37. See, e.g., Sequoyah v.Tenn.Valley Auth., 620 F2d 1159,1164 (6th Cir. 1980).
38. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F2d 735, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
39. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gul-
lett, 706 F2d 856, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1983).
40. The Navajo Nation v United States Forest Service case is commonly referred to as
"the San Francisco Peaks litigation;" this Article will use those two terms interchangeably.
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was therefore a bitter reminder that the courts have a history of not being
helpful to Indian tribes on the issue of sacred sites protection.4 1
Since many articles have already engaged in lengthy analysis and de-
scription of Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service,42 this Article will
only summarize the issues in that case, focusing on how the various court
decisions determined whether a substantial burden had been imposed on
Native religious practitioners. At issue in the litigation was a decision by
the United States Forest Service to allow the Snowbowl, a ski resort lo-
cated within the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona, to make artificial snow
using recycled sewage water.43 The decision allowed up to 1.5 million gal-
lons of the recycled water to be dumped on the Peaks each day.44 The
Peaks are considered sacred by many Indian tribes, the Navajo and the
Hopi among them.5 The tribes claimed that the recycled sewage water
would pollute the Peaks and prevent their religious practitioners from
performing certain ceremonies within the Peaks since these ceremonies
use water and native plants that would now be contaminated.4 6
The federal district court held that the tribes had failed to show that
their religious exercises would be substantially burdened under RFRA
because they had not shown that the government's action pressured tribal
adherents either to commit acts forbidden by the religion or prevented
them from engaging in religious conduct that the religion mandated. 47
The district court emphasized that "[p]laintiffs have not identified any
plants, springs or natural resources within the ... area that would be af-
fected by the Snowbowl upgrades. They have identified no shrines or
religious ceremonies that would be impacted by the Snowbowl deci-
sion."4" The court also noted that the tribes did not show that any
religious ceremonies actually took place within the 777-acre ski resort,49
and remarked that the ski area consisted of about only 1 percent of the
total San Francisco Peaks area.5o The tribes would still have access to some
74,000 acres within the Peaks for religious purposes."
41. For a retrospective analysis on treatment of Native American religions, see Alli-
son Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization
Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1997).
42. For one of the more comprehensive analyses, see Jonathan Knapp, Making Snow
in the Desert: Defining A Substantial Burden under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259 (2009).
43. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).
44. Id. at 1082.
45. Id. at 1063, 1099-1102.
46. Id. at 1103-06.
47. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv, 408 F Supp.2d 866, 904-05 (D. Ariz. 2006),
rev'd, 479 F3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
48. Id. at 905.
49. Id. at 888.
50. Id. at 883.
51. Id. at 905.
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A panel for the Ninth Circuit reversed.12 The panel found that the
Indians' religion would be burdened in two respects. First, particular cer-
emonies requiring purity could no longer be done because the local
plants and water would be contaminated." Second, the religious exercises
"require belief in the mountain's purity or a spiritual connection to the
mountain that would be undermined by the contamination."" While the
district court had discounted this second aspect of the burden and focused
on alternative ways for the tribes to continue their religious practices
while avoiding the effects of the recycled water, the three-judge panel
focused more comprehensively on the Indian religion's view of the Peaks
and on the state of mind of the religious practitioners." The judges fo-
cused on whether the Indians believed dumping the recycled water on
the Peaks violated the tenets of their religion." The panel concluded by
stating,
We uphold the RFRA claim in this case in part because oth-
erwise we cannot see a starting place. If Appellants do not have
a valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any
Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA
claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land they hold sa-
cred. 7
Having found a substantial burden, the panel held that the governmental
interest in public recreation was not one of the highest order." As stated
earlier, the Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, reversed the panel deci-
sion and held that under RFRA, the tribes had not shown that the
exercise of their religion was substantially burdened because the religious
practitioners were neither coerced into doing something against their re-
ligious beliefs nor were they denied a benefit as a consequence of
following the tenets of their religion. 9
RFRA is ambivalent on determining what constitutes a substantial
burden. On one hand the Act's purpose is said to be "to restore the com-
pelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder."'
On the other hand, the Congressional findings announced that "the
52. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 E3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), affd, 535 F3d
1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. Id. at 1039.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1038-42.
56. After stating that "the whole mountain is regarded as a single, living entity," the
court gave a detailed analysis of how the presence of sewage effluent on the Peaks would
fundamentally undermine all of the tribes' religious practices. Id.
57. Id. at 1048.
58. Id. at 1044-46.
59. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008).
60. 42 U.S.C. S 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (internal citations omitted).
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compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing ... governmental interests."' The problem is that the Supreme
Court's understanding of the compelling interest test, and especially what
constitutes a substantial burden, has not remained static since Sherbert v.
Verner2 and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 61 So the statement of RFRA's purpose is
not easy to reconcile with RFRA's findings.6 1
Although the Ninth Circuit in its Navajo Nation en banc opinion
reconciled RFRA's purpose with its findings by taking the position that,
because the statute mentioned Yoder and Sherbert, a substantial burden un-
der RFRA was limited to the exact type of burdens involved in these two
cases (denial of a governmental benefit or coercion of practitioners by
imposing a criminal penalty for following the tenets of their religion), this
interpretation is surely incorrect. The tribal attorneys in Navajo Nation
argued that "[t]he important question from the standpoint of religious
freedom is simply whether government action significantly interferes with
religious practices, not whether it happens to do so by the same mean as a
prior Supreme Court case."6 1 In fact, neither Sherbert nor Yoder actually
mentioned the words "substantial burden."6  The Court in Sherbert spoke
only in terms of "any incidental burden on the free exercise" must be
"justified by a compelling interest."6 7 Thus, after stating "[w]e turn first to
the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion,"6 the Sherbert Court quoted
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006).
62. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist who
had been denied unemployment benefits after she lost her job for refusing to work on
Saturdays, which was the Sabbath in her religion. Id. at 399. The Court upheld her free
exercise claim, stating that the government had imposed a substantial burden on her with-
out a compelling governmental interest protected by the least restrictive means. Id. at
406-08.
63. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder the Court upheld the claim of Amish parents who
refused to send their children to school past the eighth grade claiming that it was against
the tenets of their religion. Id. at 234-35. Under state law, school attendance was compul-
sory and parents faced potential criminal penalties for failing to comply. Id. at 207-08.
64. On the interpretive issues raised by RFRA see generally Thomas C. Berg, What
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Relgious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL.
L. REv. 1 (1994); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Iterpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA:A Lawyer's
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Morr. L. REv. 171 (1995).
65. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2763 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 46999 at *27.
66. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1175, 1213-14 (1996) (finding that Sherbert's analysis "provides little guidance for the sub-
stantiality inquiry," while Yoder was "equally unilluininating").
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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from Braunfeld v. Brown69 for the proposition that a law would be unconsti-
tutional even if it only "impede[d]" religious observances through
"indirect" burdens. 0 As for the jurisprudence on substantial burden after
Yoder but before Employment Division v. Smith, one scholar described it as
"not especially instructive.""
II. THE PRECLUSIVE FORCE OF LYNG
This Part discusses whether Lyng precludes defining "burden" in sa-
cred sites cases beyond coercion and denial of government benefits. As
stated in the preceding section, although RFRA imposed a substantial
burden requirement before the government could be required to bring
forth a compelling interest, the pre-Smith law on substantial burden was ill
defined. 72 There are two possible interpretations of Lyng. First, it can be
argued that just like in Smith, the Court refused to use the strict scrutiny
test in cases involving the government's management of its own internal
affairs, including its land management." Under this interpretation Lyng,
like Smith, was overturned by RFRA, and courts are now free to come
up with a different definition of substantial burden under RFRA. The
other interpretation of Lyng is that the Court used the strict scrutiny test,
but did not reach the compelling interest part of the test because the
plaintiffs did not show a substantial burden.
The strongest argument for the first interpretation is found in the
debate between Justices Scalia and O'Connor in Employment Division v.
Smith.Justice Scalia cited to both Bowen v. Roy" and Lyng to show that he
was not breaking new ground in refusing to use the strict scrutiny test."
The Smith Court interpreted both Bowen and Lyng as not having used the
strict scrutiny test.7 6 In Bowen, the claimants had alleged that the govern-
ment's use of a Social Security number for their daughter, Little Bird of
the Snow, would rob her of her spirit and thus was a burden on their
69. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
70. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Brautnfeld, 366 U.S. at 607).
71. Dorf, supra.note 66, at 1214 (citing two Native American religious freedom
cases, Lyng v. Northwest fIndian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Roy v. Bowen, 476
U.S. 693 (1986), in which the Court did not find substantial burdens even though the
governmental actions would imperil the practitioners' spiritual well-being).
72. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 594-96
(1998) (explaining why RFRA has not been successfully used by religious practitioners
and attributing this failure partly to courts adopting a narrow definition of substantial
burden).
73. See, e.g., Eric D. Yordy, Commentary, Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to
Relieve the Current Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 191, 206-07 (2009).
74. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
75. Emp't Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (stating that in both cases "we
declined to apply Sherbert analysis").
76. Id.
SPRING 2012] 279
Michigan journal of Race & Law
religion." The Court disagreed. Taking the position that the free exercise
clause cannot be interpreted to require the government to conduct its
own internal affairs in conformance with the religious beliefs of various
citizens, it pointedly remarked that "Roy may no more prevail on his reli-
gious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for
his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or
color of the Government's filing cabinets." 8 In a revealing footnote, Jus-
tice Scalia in Smith observed that
Justice O'Connor seeks to distinguish Lyng and Bowen on the
ground that those cases involved the government's conduct of
"its own internal affairs" . . . . [I]t is hard to see any reason in
principle and practicality why the government should have to
tailor its health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of
religious belief, but should not have to tailor its management
of public lands or its administration of welfare programs.7 9
In her concurrence,Justice O'Connor responded that in both Bowen
and Lyng "we expressly distinguished Sherbert on the ground that the First
Amendment does not 'require the Government itself to behave in ways
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual develop-
ment.' "80 Although this statement from Justice O'Connor is not pellucid
as far as clarifying whether she thought she had used the strict scrutiny
test in Lyng, even if it is conceded for the purpose of the argument that
she thought she had used the test the majority of the Court in Smith
plainly disagreed with her. By the time Congress enacted RFRA, it
should have been on notice that at least the Smith majority thought that
both Bowen and Lyng could not be meaningfully distinguished from Smith.
If that is the case, it can be argued that if RFRA was meant to overturn
Smith, it also was meant to overturn at least the reasoning, if not the out-
come, of Lyng.
Even if Justice O'Connor did not use the strict scrutiny test in Lyng
and therefore the case does not control future litigation under RFRA, the
question would remain whether under the strict scrutiny test as it was
devised before Smith, substantial burden in sacred site cases should be lim-
ited to cases of govermnent coercion/denial of governmental benefits.'
Apart from Lyng as stare decisis, is there any reason to limit what is a sub-
stantial burden to coercion or conferral of a government benefit? Is there
something special about the phrasing of the free exercise clause? Justice
77. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.
78. Id. at 699-700.
79. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86 n.2 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 900 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
81. For a discussion on burdens generally, see Dorf, supra note 66. On burdens in
free exercise cases specifically, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 18.
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O'Connor tried to make the argument that there is by stating that the
operative word in the amendment is that the government shall not "pro-
hibit" the free exercise of religion. But is there anything so talismanic
about this word? Examining the meaning of the word "prohibiting" in the
free exercise clause, Professor Michael McConnell wrote that the distinc-
tion between "prohibit" and "abridge," as those words are used in the First
Amendment, "is probably overdrawn in the context of the free exercise
debate."8 2 Professor McConnell concluded that "[d]espite its plausibility as
a textual matter, the narrow interpretation of 'prohibiting' should there-
fore be rejected, and the term should be read as meaning approximately
the same as 'infringing' or 'abridging.' "83
Ultimately, however, to argue that Justice O'Connor did not use the
strict scrutiny test because the free exercise clause simply does not apply
to the management of federal lands may prove too much. For instance, no
one would argue that other parts of the First Amendment, such as the
establishment clause or the free speech clause, are not applicable to the
management of federal lands. Thus, in her Lyng opinion, Justice
O'Connor stated, "respondents contend that the burden on their religious
practices is heavy enough to violate the free exercise clause unless the
Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete the G-O
road or to engage in timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. We
disagree.""
Therefore, a second possible interpretation of Lyng is that when it
comes to challenging the way the government manages its internal affairs,
including its public lands, religious practitioners have to show either that
they are being coerced to do something against their religion or that they
are being denied a benefit because they decided to live by the tenets of
their religion.85 Thus the Lyng Court found that its facts could not be
meaningfully distinguished from Bowen v. Roy, and concluded that "[i]n
neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the
Government's action into violating their religious belief, nor would either
governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any person an
equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citi-
zens."86 The Court added that although indirect coercion as well as
outright prohibitions are subject to strict scrutiny, such a finding could
82. Michael . McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1486 (1990).
83. Id. at 1488; see also Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: Tlie Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 867, 893 (1994) (arguing that
even though each of these terms have their own independent meanings that could control
judicial reviews of the laws being challenged, in reality the textual language is almost never
dispositive).
84. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
85. See Knapp, supra note 42, at 273-74.
86. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
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not imply that every incidental effect which does not coerce individuals
to act contrary to their religious beliefs requires the government to show
a compelling state interest." This is probably the fairest interpretation of
Lyng. Although some have argued for limiting this aspect of Lyng to cases
where the Indian practitioners attempt to exclude everyone else from a
sacred area, nothing in the text of Lyng supports such an interpretation."
Even if Lyng did use strict scrutiny and adopted a narrow definition
of substantial burden, I believe a strong argument can be made that
RFRA allows the court to broaden the definition of burden. This Article
does not deny that there should be some meaningful burden on a person's
religion before the government can be asked to put forth an important or
significant interest allowing for the action." Lyng's interpretation of sub-
stantial burden resulted in a striking paradox: the Court acknowledged
that prohibiting Indians' access to a sacred site would raise a free exercise
claim, but held that completely destroying that same site would not.90
There must be, therefore, more reasonable alternatives to the concept of
"burden" as it was defined in Lyng." As stated by the dissent in Navajo
Nation v. United States Forest Service, "RFRA provides greater protection
for religious practices than did the Supreme Court's pre-Smith cases ....
'RFRA goes beyond the constitutional language that forbids the prohibit-
ing of the free exercise of religion and uses the broader verb burden.' "92
As one scholar noted, although Congress in RFRA did not "purport to
change the law" of substantial burden, "the prior law was poorly defined
87. Id. at 450-51.
88. See Peter Zwick, Note, A Redeemable Loss: Lyng, Lower Courts and American Indi-
an Free Exercise on Public Lands, 60 CASE W REs. L. REV. 241, 275 (2009).
89. See Brownstein, How Rights Are tfringed, supra note 83, at 902; Andy G. Olree,
The Continuing Threshold test for Free Exercise Claims, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103,
106, 121-25 (2008) (showing how the test for determining what is a substantial burden
was devised before Smith, has never been repudiated since Smith and should remain an
important part of the strict scrutiny test).
90. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 ("The Constitution does not permit government to dis-
criminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred, and a law
prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a
different set of constitutional questions.").
91. See, e.g., Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Relgion: A Subjective Alternative, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1258, 1259 (1989) (arguing that "a free exercise burden should be deemed
to exist when a claimant demonstrate a sincere belief that a government activity interferes
with the exercise of his religious beliefs or practices").
92. 535 F3d 1058, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bauer, 84 E3d
1549, 1558 (9th Cir. 1996)). Many commentators have followed the same position. See, e.g.,
Wiles, supra note 3, at 494 ("[C]ourts should consider whether from the point of view of
the practitioner, the government has in fact imposed such a burden that reaches the level
of substantiality that RFRA was designed to protect."). It should also be noted that when
Congress amended RFRA in RLUIPA in 2000 it provided for an expanded definition of
"exercise of religion" to mean "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. §5 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006).
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and subject to pro-government manipulation."13 Another scholar, Michael
Dorf, remarked, "[n]either the text nor the legislative history of RFRA
provides a clear indication of how courts ought to determine whether an
incidental burden on religion is in fact substantial." After noting that the
legislative report issued by the United States House of Representatives
stated that there was an "expectation that the courts will look to free ex-
ercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in
determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened,"' Pro-
fessor Dorf nevertheless concluded that RFRA did not "simply restore
the pre-Smith law" and that "RFRA would thus seem to endorse a specif-
ic version of the pre-Smith law, 'the high water mark of free exercise
accommodation.'"
9 6
Other scholars, however, have a glibber view of RFRA's intent. Af-
ter remarking that the pre-Smith law developed by the Court had only
few supporters and had been criticized as being part of the decline, and
not the restoration, of religious liberties, Professor Ira Lupu concluded,
"[o]nly insensitivity to Native American faiths, which had borne the
brunt of the development of the doctrine of 'burdens,' can explain why
Congress selected this formulation."' Later in his article, Professor Lupu
argued that the developing case law on substantial burden "disclosed no
consistent theory-indeed very little theory at all-through which the
concept can be understood,"98 and suggested that Congress's seeming
adoption of such a definition of burden represents a view which is "noto-
riously insensitive to religions rooted in customary practices, rather than
obligations."99 In the end Professor Lupu was not optimistic and conclud-
ed that in interpreting RFRA, courts will in all likelihood construe the
Act to "incorporate a narrow view of substantial burdens, one that re-
quires a strenuous form of coercion and a weighty impact on a matter of
religious obligation."'" In many ways, this should be expected since the
lower courts would have to follow the lead of a Supreme Court that has
not supported free exercise rights generally and minority religions in par-
ticular."'
93. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, supra note 72, at 594.
94. Dorf, supra note 66, at 1213.
95. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7 (1993)).
96. Dorf supra note 66, at 1213 (quoting Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through
It, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249, 256 (1995)). Dorf also added that Lyng did "not provide any
clear basis for a distinction between substantial and insubstantial basis." Id. at 1214.
97. See Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA, supra note 64, at 190.
98. Id. at 202.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 220-21.
101. See Frank S. Ravitch, Rights and the Rehion Clauses, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 91, 111-12 (2008) (arguing that the Court has modified its free exercise doctrines
to favor dominant/majority religions).
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It is true that parts of the legislative history of RFRA indicate that
Congress did not intend to overturn cases such as Lyng and Bowen, which
had come up with a very narrow definition of substantial burden.102 For
instance, as stated in the Senate Report,
Pre-Smith case law makes it clear that only governmental ac-
tions that place a substantial burden on the exercise of religion
must meet the compelling interest test set forth in the Act ...
And, while the committee expresses neither approval nor dis-
approval of that case law, pre-Smith case law makes it clear that
strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving
only management of internal governmental affairs or the use
of the Government's own property or resources. 0 3
On the other hand, the Senate Report also stated, "[t]he comnuittee
wishes to stress that the act does not express approval or disapproval of the
result reached in any particular court decision involving the free exercise
of religion ... . This bill is not a codification of the result reached in any
prior free exercise decision ..... "1 Furthermore, the House Report stated
that "in order to violate the statute, government activity need not coerce
individuals into violating their religious beliefs nor penalize religious ac-
tivity."' According to the House Report, such governmental activity
need only have "a substantial external impact on the practice of reli-
gion."'0 6 Some scholars took the position that such language may have
been a specific endorsement of the test adopted by Justice Brennan in his
Lyng dissent.'0 7
A good argument can also be made that the Supreme Court's more
recent RFRA opinion in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao
Do Vegetal'os announced at least an inclination to interpret RFRA liberally
and more favorably to religious interests. The issue in 0 Centro was
whether the government had met its burden of showing a compelling
interest to prevent members of a church from ingesting hoasca as part of
their religious ceremonies.'09 Regulated under the Controlled Substance
102. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 64, at 229 ("Regardless of one's opinion
about these cases, the Senate Conunittee said that RFRA does not affect [Bowen v. Roy
and Lyng]f").
103. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, at 1898.
There was also a colloquy between Senators Grassley and Hatch in which Senator Hatch
stated that RFRA would have "no effect" on cases similar to Bowen and Lyng. 139 CONG.
REC. S.14,350, 14,365 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
104. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993).
105. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993).
106. Id.
107. See Berg, supra note 64, at 54.
108. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
109. Id. at 423.
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Act,"o Hoasca is a hallucinogen derived from ingredients found in the
Amazonian jungle.' The government in 0 Centro took the position that
the Court should follow a "categorical approach" in evaluating its com-
pelling interest."12 It wanted the Court to evaluate more categorically
whether the Controlled Substances Act as a whole advanced an
interest that was compelling enough, and whether such an interest would
be generally threatened if courts started to grant potentially large numbers
of exceptions. "I The Court disagreed, stating,
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an
inquiry more focused than the Government's categorical ap-
proach. RFRA requires the government to demonstrate that
the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of
the challenged law "to the person"-the particular claimant
whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially bur-
dened." 4
The 0 Centro Court found that since the United States had already ex-
empted hundreds of thousands of Native Americans ingesting Peyote
from the law, the government could not show that it had a compelling
interest in not allowing an exemption for just the 130 or so members in-
gesting hoasca as part of their religious ceremonies."' Because RFRA had
specifically mentioned that Congress was adopting the compelling interest
test as applied in Sherbert and Yoder, the Court noted that "[i]n each of
those cases, this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justify-
ing the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants."'16
In 0 Centro, the government had conceded the substantiality of the
burden and the only issue was how to evaluate the compelling govern-
mental interest."' So while 0 Centro is not exactly on point, it is
important to note that just like there were, before Smith, two methodolo-
gies on how to evaluate the substantiality of burdens, there were also
multiple ways to evaluate how compelling a governmental interest was.
The 0 Centro Court, faced with the language of RFRA and its reference
to Sherbert and Yoder, opted to follow the approach that was more
110. 21 U.S.C. SS 801-904 (2006).
111. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 425.
112. Id. at 430.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 430-31.
115. Id. at 433-34.
116. Id. at 431.
117. Id. at 426.
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beneficial to the religious claimant"' and adopted a focused rather than a
categorical approach."' Certainly there are those who believe that it is
because RFRA does mandate strict scrutiny that courts will in all likeli-
hood continue to adopt a cramped view of substantial burden so as not to
reach the "compelling interest" part of the test as the Court did in 0 Cen-
tro.'20 Yet other scholars have taken the position that 0 Centro altered the
approach to the benefit of religious practitioners. 2' Still others have noted
that since that case, the government's chances of losing its compelling in-
terest argument have increased.1 22
Besides adopting a different approach to evaluate how compelling
governmental interests are, 0 Centro may also have announced a general
change of mood towards religion. For instance in answering the type of
slippery-slope argument that was also present in Lyng and is made in most
sacred-sites cases, the Court stated,
The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of
bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you,
I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions to "rules
of general applicability." Congress determined that the legislat-
ed test "is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests."12 3
118. See Matthew Nicholson, Note, Is O Centro a Sign of Hope for RFRA Claimants?,
95 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1289-90 (2009).
119. Id. at 1289-93 (describing the difference between the "focused" and "categori-
cal" approaches as being related to the level of generality at which the government is
required to frame its compelling interest). The "categorical" approach allows the govern-
ment to describe broadly what the government's interest is, while the "focused" approach
forces the government to explain why the government's interest is compelling in this par-
ticular case. Id.
120. Id. at 1301.
121. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Conzales:A Look at State RFRAs,
55 S.D. L. REv. 466, 472 (2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court gave RFRA the sort of expansive
interpretation it deserved. And in some ways, it left us to wonder whether religious liberty
was even better off under Gonzales than it had been before Smith."); see also Amit Shah,
The Impact of Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S 418
(2006), 10 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 4, 26 (2008) ("[B]y requiring the government to
show more than just generalized assertions of policy or Congressional findings to prove a
compelling interest, minority religious practices are more likely to succeed in RFRA liti-
gation.").
122. See Ari B. Fontecchio, Compelling the Courts to Question Gonzales v. 0 Centro:A
Public Harms Approach to Free Exercise Analysis, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. Ir. 227, 228 (2010)
("The raw data suggests that the government had a 17.4% chance of losing its compelling
interest argument before 0 Centro and a 35.7% chance of losing after 0 Centro.").
123. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao DoVegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006).
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Finally, the interpretation of RFRA should be at least influenced by
the United Nations' adoption in 2007 of its Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.' 24 Although not "binding" as such on the United
States, the Declaration is now part of the evolving norms of international
law.l25 Relevant to the topic of this Article, the Declaration contains three
articles directly related to sacred sites. Article 1t concerns the right of in-
digenous peoples to practice their cultural traditions, and specifically
"includes the right to maintain, protect, and develop the past, present and
future manifestations of their culture, such as archeological and historical
sites."'26 Similarly, Article 12, concerning the general right of indigenous
peoples to practice their religious traditions and ceremonies, also men-
tions their special "right to maintain, protect and have access in privacy to
their religious and cultural sites."'27 Finally, Article 25 states, "[i]ndigenous
peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritu-
al relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and
used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas."' 28 It is too early to assess
the impact the Declaration will have on the right of indigenous people to
self-government and self-determination globally, although the scholarly
debate has already begun.129
124. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/NO6/512/07/PDF/NO651207.pdfOpenElement. On December 16,
2010, President Obama declared that the United States would reverse the position taken
during the Bush Administration and become the last country to drop its opposition to the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Valerie Richardson, Obama Adopts
UN. Manifesto on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/16/obama-adopts-un-manifesto-on-
rights-of-indigenous-/.
125. See Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous People: Achievements and
Continuous Challenges, supra note 31, at 130 ("United Nations declarations, like almost any
other resolution by the General Assembly, are of a mere hortatory nature: they are charac-
terized as 'recommendations' without legally binding character .... To the extent that the
Declaration reflects pre-existing customary international law or engenders future such law,
it is binding on states which do not qualify as persistent objectors.").
126. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 11(1),
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO6/512/07/PDF/NO651207.pdf.OpenElement.
127. Id. at art. 12(1).
128. Id. at art. 25.
129. See, e.g., Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The U N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People in the Context of Hunan Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141 (2001) (arguing
that the Declaration privileges an individual human rights paradigm at the expense of a
strong form of indigenous self-determination); Jo M. Pasqualucci, International indigenous
Lnd Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J.
51 (2009) (examining the impact and inter-relationship between the U.N. Declaration and
the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); Sarah Stevenson, Com-
ment, lIdigenous Land Rights and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
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In conclusion, while there are very strong arguments that, especially
after 0 Centro, Lyng did not and should not foreclose courts from adopt-
ing a different definition of substantial burden when considering claims
made under RFRA, there is still a likelihood that most judges, reluctant
to force the government to come up with a compelling interest protected
by the least restrictive means, will take refuge in Lyng's substantial burden
definition and dismiss tribal sacred site cases. Thus, in the next Part, this
Article proposes a legislative solution that strikes a fair balance between
religious and secular interests. It attempts to do so with full awareness of
the Smith Court's statement that "[i]t may fairly be said that leaving ac-
commodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in,"' but also taking
into account Justice Scalia's suggestion that this "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself.""'
III. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The legislative solution this Article proposes would amend the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)'32 so as to give a spe-
cific cause of action to federally recognized Indian tribes attempting to
protect sites located on federal land as long such sites have been held sa-
cred according to traditional Native American religions. There are three
essential features of the proposed amendment: first, the adoption of an
intermediate type of scrutiny instead of the traditional strict scrutiny usu-
ally applied to free exercise cases; second, a broadening of the threshold
element of burden beyond the coercion/denial of benefit test; and finally,
a more precise delimitation for the definition of sacred sites. The amend-
ment I propose is modeled after the 1994 amendments to AIRFA
inasmuch as it is only applicable to Indians and Indian tribes. The 1994
AIRFA Amendments prevented the United States or states from prosecut-
ing Native Americans for using Peyote "for bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indi-
an religion."3 3
Implications for Maori Land Claims in New Zealand, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298 (2008) (ex-
amining the potential impacts of the U.N. Declaration on the rights of the Maoris);
Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1166 (2008) (recognizing that
while the amount of self government guaranteed in the Declaration is indeterminate, this
may be a good thing given the diversity of aspirations among indigenous peoples).
130. Emp't Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C. %§ 1996-1996a (2006).
133. Id. § 1996a(b)(1).
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The proposed amendment should be immune from constitutional at-
tacks arguing that it discriminates in favor of a suspect class. Under Morton v.
Mancari,"I federal laws treating members of Indian tribes differently are not
viewed as involving a suspect racial classification for the purpose of evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of such laws under the equal protection clause.
Instead, the classification of Indian is viewed as a political classification; an
Indian tribe is a political organization with a government-to-government
or trust relationship with the United States.135 As such, federal laws treating
members of Indian tribes differently are not evaluated under strict scruti-
ny and will not be disturbed "as long as [they] can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians."16
Such legislation should also be immune from attacks asserting that it is in
violation of the establishment clause, since it represents precisely the kind
of remedy the Court in Smith suggested religious practitioners should be
seeking.'37 Besides, the legislation does not in and of itself create an ex-
emption for Indian tribes attempting to protect sacred sites. It just
provides a different opportunity than the one already contained in RFRA
for protecting Native American sacred sites.
Any legislation aimed at protecting sacred sites will confront the fol-
lowing political and legal arguments: First, even though the sites were
originally within tribal territories, they are today located on federal land.
As such, powerful interests currently leasing or using such lands will ob-
ject to Indians obtaining a veto power over federal management decisions.
Second, because Indian religions are perceived as mysterious and because
the location of sacred sites can be at times ill-defined, once claims to sa-
cred sites are recognized, the floodgates may open, leaving nothing to stop
Indians from claiming vast areas as sacred, thus freezing economic activi-
ties over numerous tracts of federal land. In order to counter or appease
such arguments, my proposal contains the following three compromises:
first, a lowering of the level of scrutiny; second, maintaining some kind of
burden requirement; and third, the delimitation of what can be considered
a sacred site.
A. Towards Intermediate Scrutiny
On many fronts, RFRA was not well thought out.13? It re-imposed a
test that was only "strict" in name. The Court had been moving away
134. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
135. Id. at 553-54.
136. Id. at 555.
137. Emp't Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Bogen & Goldstein,
supra note 28, at 60-65.
138. See generally Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, supra note 72. Professor Lupu also took
the position that the Judiciary Committee staff may have been somewhat over its head
when it came to understanding the fine points of the religion clauses. Lupu, Of Time and
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from the high water mark of strict scrutiny cases such as Sherbert and Yoder
by either allowing the government to claim as compelling interests that
really were not, or by adopting a narrow interpretation of substantial bur-
den. At least one commentator took the position that the test being used
before Smith was really a form of intermediate scrutiny.'39 The problem
with the real strict scrutiny test in free exercise cases was that courts in the
pre-Smith era seemed to have thought that it was too demanding a test on
the government.' No doubt this uneasiness with strict scrutiny contrib-
uted to its abandonment in Smith. Therefore, while cognizant of the
potential pitfalls,"' this Article contends that a legislative solution is one
option worth exploring even though there have been previous unsuccess-
ful efforts at enacting legislation on this issue.'4 2
The solution this Article advocates is a compromise: While it adopts
a broader definition of substantial burden, it also suggests the use of a
mid-level type of scrutiny in reviewing governmental management of
public lands involving sacred sites alleged to interfere with free exercise
rights of Indian tribes. Intermediate scrutiny is most closely associated
with gender discrimination. In a foundational gender discrimination case,
the Court in Craig v. Boren stated, "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge,
previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objec-
tives."143 The intermediate scrutiny test this Article envisions, however, is
modeled after the test adopted in United States v. O'Brien,14 which uses
free speech methodology to challenge content-neutral laws that affect
symbolic conduct such as burning one's draft card. The O'Brien Court
held,
the RFRA, supra note 64, at 190. Thus he accused the Senate Report of insapprehending
the Act's operation in several ways and remarked that "[t]he Senate Report's illustration,
which runs together without a missed beat RFRA's rule and the exception to it, does not
inspire confidence that its authors knew or cared about the difference between them." Id.
139. Nicholas Nugent, Note, Toward a RFRA that Works, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1028
(2008) (arguing that courts should use intermediate scrutiny when applying RFRA).
140. Tania Saison, Note, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. Pioss. 653, 655 (1995) (arguing that the compelling
interest test's standard was too high to meet and that RFRA should not have adopted it).
141. See generally Ira C. Lupu, T7e Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liber-
ty, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 565 (1999).
142. The most recent effort was a bill introduced by Congressman Nick Rahall on
June 11, 2003, the Native American Sacred Lands Act. H.R. 2419, 108th Cong. (2003).
The Bill would have allowed Tribes to intervene in administrative proceedings to have
sacred sites declared unsuitable for certain federal activities. Id. § 3(b)(1).The Bill also pro-
vided for consultation with the appropriate Indian tribes concerning activities having
significant impacts on sacred sites. Id. 5 8 (a).
143. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
144. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest."
Under my proposed test, once a claimant shows a burden upon his exer-
cise of religion, the government would have to come forth with an
important or substantial interest. That governmental interest would have
to be unrelated to the suppression of religion, and the burdens posed on
religious freedom could be no greater than those essential to protect that
governmental interest."'
Although most Native American religious practitioners may at first
be reluctant to support such a position, it is important to clarify here that
the legislation does not discriminate against Native Americans. In other
words, it does not impose a more stringent test on Native Americans by
asking the government to only meet intermediate scrutiny requirements
while imposing strict scrutiny on claims brought by non-Indians. Native
Americans attempting to protect sacred sites can still litigate under
RFRA. This legislation just gives them an alternate remedy. Although
Native Americans may be hesitant to abandon strict scrutiny in exchange
for intermediate scrutiny with a relaxation of the burden requirement, for
the following reasons, this exchange is worth considering.
First, as demonstrated in Part 1, it seems that many scholars and
judges would interpret Lyng as imposing a restrictive view of substantial
burden, one that would foreclose protection of sacred sites under RFRA.
Additionally, there are some reasons to believe that RFRA was not meant
to overturn Lyng; at least some of the legislative history shows this to be
the case.'47
Second, scholars have shown that the rate of success in free exercise
cases was not very good before Smith."' This indicates that strict scrutiny
was not really applied.'19 Instead, courts used a type of intermediate
145. Id. at 377.
146. For a discussion on the rise and application of intermediate scrutiny in First
Amendment cases, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Internediate Scrutiny
in First Anendmnturisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783 (2007).
147. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
148. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 796-97 (2006) (finding that in 60 per-
cent of free exercise cases, the government won even though courts purported to use strict
scrutiny).
149. See EugeneVolokh, A Connon-Law Model For Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1494-98 (1999).
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scrutiny when the law being challenged was a neutral law of general ap-
plicability.
Third, some influential scholars have advocated that, should the
Court modify or overrule Smith, an intermediate scrutiny test should be
used for all free exercise challenges.5 0 Others have even argued that courts
should apply intermediate scrutiny in RFRA cases notwithstanding the
statutory language directing the use of strict scrutiny because that was in
fact the type of scrutiny used in free exercise cases before Smith.'5 '
Finally, as noted by some scholars, even though they are both fun-
damental rights, the Court has been more respectful of freedom of speech
than freedom of religion.'52 Other scholars have argued that the difference
in level of scrutiny used in speech and religion cases could perhaps ex-
plain this disparity.' 3 Thus, they argue that using intermediate scrutiny
with respect to neutral laws of general applicability would bring free ex-
ercise jurisprudence more in line with the methodology used in freedom
of speech and other First Amendment cases.' In free speech cases, the
level of scrutiny varies with the context. Thus, strict scrutiny is only used
when the law challenged is not viewpoint or content neutral."'
Within free speech jurisprudence, a good analogy can be found be-
tween regulations affecting sacred sites and the limitations existing on
government regulations of speech in the public forum.'16 The concept of
the public forum was developed to evaluate regulation of speech in areas
owned by the government but generally opened to the public, such as
streets and sidewalks.'-7 Most of the sacred sites we are concerned with
here are also located on government-owned land that is generally open to
150. See generally Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W
RES. L. REv. 55 (2006); Frederick Mark Geddicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doc-
trine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000); Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion
After the Fall:The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925 (1998).
151. See Nugent, supra note 139, at 1034-40 (arguing that the text of RFRA refers to
strict scrutiny as applied in Sherbert and Yoder, but showing that the state interests in those
cases were not really compelling and that the scrutiny used was more like intermediate
scrutiny). Nugent also points out that if RFRA's scrutiny was really meant to be the type
of strict scrutiny used in equal protection and free speech cases, many of the pre-Smith
Free Exercise cases, such as Sherbert, would come up differently under RFRA. Id. at 1039.
Yet this does not appear to have been what Congress intended. Id.
152. Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why
Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 431 (2006); Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treat-
ment of Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 363 (2004).
153. See, e.g., Geddicks, supra note 150, at 935-38.
154. Id.
155. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
156. See Gordon, supra note 22, at 1466-69.
157. For a discussion on speech in the public forum generally, see Robert Post, Be-
tween Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1713 (1987).
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the public. Neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in the
public forum are evaluated under intermediate scrutiny."' Generally
speaking, the government can regulate speech in the public forum as long
as the regulations are content neutral; involve reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions; serve an important governmental interest; are nar-
rowly tailored to protect that interest; and leave "ample alternative means
of communications.""' The Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism added,
"[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than neces-
sary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation will not
be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest
could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."'6
The Ward Court also noted that this test was essentially the same as the
intermediate scrutiny test used in O'Brien to determine the validity of
government restrictions on symbolic speech.'6' Even though the Court
has identified many types of intermediate scrutiny in free speech cases
depending on the context, lower courts have tended to merge all these
various brands into one generic test under which "laws will be upheld so
long as they serve some sort of a significant/substantial/important gov-
ernmental interest and are reasonably well tailored to that purpose (i.e. not
unreasonably overbroad)."' 61 Following the analogy, the Ward/O'Brien in-
termediate scrutiny test should be applicable to challenge governmental
actions affecting religious exercises conducted at sacred sites located on
federal lands in areas generally open to the public.
Different levels of scrutiny are also used in ballot access cases, alt-
hough these are more appropriately considered voting rights cases than
First Amendment cases. The analogy to these cases is especially interesting
because just as sacred sites issues involve the federal government's interest
in managing its own lands, state governments also have the constitutional
right to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.' The analogy is
also appropriate here because in these cases, the level of scrutiny varies
with the substantiality of the burden.' In the ballot access cases, the
court first determines how severe the burden is and then, depending on
158. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
159. Id. at 791. The Court also stated, "a regulation of the time, place, or manner of
protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-
neutral interest but ... it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing
so." Id. at 798.
160. Id. at 800.
161. Id. at 797-98. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), however, does not
contain the requirement that there be ample alternative means of communications. See
supra text accompanying note 145.
162. Bhagwat, supra note 146, at 801.
163. Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution provides, "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the legislature thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
164. See Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed, supra note 83, at 914-19.
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the answer, uses a strict or a more relaxed level of review.16' Thus the
Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in evaluating the consti-
tutionality of a law requiring voters to present a government issued
identification card before being allowed to vote, first determined that the
burden on the voters was not that severe,166 before sidestepping strict scru-
tiny in favor of the balancing approach devised in Anderson v. Celebrezze.16
It should be noted, however, that the Justices do not seem to be in
total agreement on the methodology to be followed in such cases. Most
of the differences of opinion center on how to evaluate the severity of the
burden not on whether a lesser degree of scrutiny is applicable once it is
determined that the burden is not that severe.' 6 However, the Justices do
not seem to agree on what this lower level of scrutiny encompasses; some
favor an open-ended balancing approach, while others, like Justice Scalia,
advocate for a much more deferential test resembling rational basis re-
view.'16 In Crawford, for instance, Justice Scalia thought that the balancing
test developed in Celebrezzeo7 0 had been somewhat modified in Burdick v.
Takushi,"'7 where the Court had adopted a much more deferential ap-
proach to state regulations.172
In the cases of sacred sites protection, I am willing to concede for
the purpose of argument that since the burden does not involve coercion
or the denial of benefits, it may not be the most severe kind of burden.
Thus, following the example of the ballot access cases, intermediate scru-
tiny would seem justifiable. While there are some who may argue that an
intermediate type of scrutiny may be too easy on the government,7 3
scholars who have compared the Court's free exercise jurisprudence with
what the Court has done in the free speech area have found that the
Court has been much more receptive to free speech claims than claims
165. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780,789 (1983).
166. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197-200 (2008).
167. Id. at 202-04 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)).
168. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping v. Balancing in the
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 507 (2008) (showing that ambiguities as to the correct methodology persist,
and describing the various approaches).
169. Id. at 523-24.
170. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
171. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
172. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205-05 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring joined by Justices Thomas and Alto).
173. See Dorf, supra note 66, at 1203-08 ("Given that the O'Brien test asks so little in
principle, it should not be surprising that it means so little in practice."); see also Alan
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal
Neutrality, 18J.L. & POL. 119,160-61 (2002); Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, supra note 72, at
592-93;Volokh, supra note 149, at 1512.
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based on free exercise. 7 4 This would tend to indicate that intermediate
scrutiny may give adequate protection to sacred sites.
B. Redefining Substantial Burden
Adopting an intermediate level of scrutiny borrowed from free
speech jurisprudence and abandoning the coercion/denial of benefits test
to determine what a substantial burden is does not answer the question of
what test should be adopted for defining substantial burden. While the
free speech cases do not generally speak in terms of a substantial burden
prerequisite as such, the time, place, and manner restrictions in public fo-
rum cases mention that in addition to the requirements of intermediate
scrutiny listed above, governmental restrictions will only be sustained if
they leave "ample alternative channels for communications.""' Professor
Dorf noted that this was the equivalent of a substantial burden require-
ment,"6 and Professor Geddicks remarked that transposing this
requirement into free exercise cases would require courts to evaluate
whether there are alternative means of exercising one's religion.'7 ' Alt-
hough he conceded that this inquiry may involve courts in the
interpretation of religious doctrine and beliefs, a practice that was criti-
cized in Smith,"8 Professor Geddicks concluded that this problem was not
"insuperable," and that in many free exercise cases, the issue would not
arise anyway."'7 In order to avoid this problem entirely, my proposed test
would not substitute the "burden" inquiry found in free exercise cases
with the "alternative means of communication" analysis found in free
speech cases. Instead, my proposed solution involves a burden inquiry, but
one that is different than the one used by the Court in Lyng.
In searching for ways to conceptualize substantial burdens to be
more understanding or receptive to Indian religions, a good place to start
is to look generally at the purposes and reasons behind the enactment of
RFRA. As one scholar put it,
The relevant principles underlying the statute are the protec-
tion of religious minorities, the maintenance of "substantive"
neutrality toward religion, and the concern with "cumulative
exemptions" undermining the statutory scheme. The category
of cognizable "burdens" should be drawn so as to remove
174. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 152; see also Carry, supra note 152, at 368-72 (show-
ing that as a result of this disparity, litigators are using free speech arguments in trying to
win free exercise cases).
175. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
176. Dorf, supra note 66, at 1208-10.
177. Geddicks, supra note 150, at 947.
178. Id. at 947-48.
179. Id. at 948.
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government interference with religious practices, without en-
couraging an unmanageable number of claims or creating
substantial incentives for others to engage in religious practices
so as to gain the relative benefits of exemption.180
Justice Brennan, in his Lyng dissent, proposed his own version of the sub-
stantial impact test.' After remarking that simply alleging that the land is
sacred is not enough to make a valid free exercise claim, Justice Brennan
took the position that religious practitioners would also have to allege
that the federal action posed "a substantial and realistic threat of under-
mining or frustrating their religious practices." 8 2 To distinguish cases like
Roy v. Bowen, Justice Brennan would also impose a requirement that the
federal decisions being challenged be shown to have "substantial external
effects."'83
In an influential pre-Smith article, Professor Lupu criticized both
Justice O'Connor's definition of substantial burden in Lyng and Justice
Brennan's suggested test in the dissent."' He advocated instead the use of
a common law type of test. Under this test, "[w]henever religious activity
is met by intentional government action analogous to that which, if
committed by a private party, would be actionable under general princi-
ples of law, a legally cognizable burden on religion is present.""' Professor
Lupu admitted that the requirement of adversity of possession may be an
impediment to the Indians' argument in situations similar to the one in
Lyng, but believed that there was enough judicial flexibility built into the
common law approach to resolve these difficulties in a satisfactory man-
ner. 6 He specifically referred to Lyng and the sacred sites issue,
concluding that "[t]he doctrine of easement by prescription, designed to
'stabiliz[e] long continued property uses,' seems especially well tailored to
the problem in Lyng, and indeed to the general problem of Indians' use of
land for religious purposes.""18
180. Berg, supra note 64, at 57.
181. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 475 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. While Justice Brennan did say that "I believe it appropriate ... to require
some showing of 'centrality,'" id. at 474, he also warned that centrality should not be de-
termined by the courts. Id. at 475. Instead, "Native Americans would be the arbiters of
which practices are central to their faith." Id.
183. Id. at 470-71.
184. See Lupu, Wiere Rights Begin, supra note 18, at 961-65 ("Even if limited by a
test of substantiality, however, an impact-based approach would be difficult to maintain in
a coherent fashion ... judging burdensomeness by impact-focused theories, even if limited
by tests of'substantiality' is unlikely to produce any more defensible results than employing
coercion-based theories.").
185. Id. at 966.
186. Id. at 974-75.
187. Id. at 973 (internal citation omitted).
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In determining what a substantial burden under RFRA should be,
Professor Dorf acknowledged, "[tlhe very concept of a substantiality test
implies a subjective weighing process. Judicial inquiry under a substanti-
ality test must therefore be subjective if courts are to be sensitive to
different contexts."'" However, he would reduce the degree of subjectivi-
ty by applying a notion of "neutrality," albeit with "greater sensitivity than
the Smith Court."'" Thus he concluded that "[b]y asking whether the
burden imposed by a particular law on an adherent of a minority faith
greatly exceeds the law's effect on the majority .. . we can give the sub-
stantiality test some concrete substance.""' Using this analysis, absent the
preclusive force of Lyng as stare decisis, Native American practitioners
should have no problems showing that certain federal management deci-
sions destructive of sacred sites would have a disproportionate impact on
their religion and would therefore create a constitutionally significant
burden on the exercise of their religious practices.
Finally, in a relatively recent opinion, Comanche Nation v. United
States,"' the Western District of Oklahoma wrote that "[t]he Tenth Circuit
has defined the term [substantial burden] by stating that a government
action which substantially burdens a religious exercise is one which must
'significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression' or 'deny reasona-
ble opportunities to engage in religious activities.' "192 Similarly, Judge
Fletcher in his Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service en banc dissent
adopted a definition of substantial burden from previous cases according
to which, "[a] governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his
or her religion ... by preventing him or her from engaging in [religious]
conduct or having a religious experience .... This interference must be
more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial."9 3
In conclusion, it seems that there are better alternatives to the coer-
cion/denial of benefit test adopted by Justice O'Connor in Lyng. A
threshold test based on religious claimants showing a significant impact
and disproportionate burdens (as compared to burdens suffered by other
religious faiths) on their ability to conduct meaningful religious exercises
should be the starting point. Any concern that this may be too easy to
meet will be tempered by the fact that the government only has to satisfy
an intermediate standard of review and, as explained in the next section,
by imposing some limits on what can be considered a sacred site.
188. Dorf, supra note 66, at 1216.
189. Id. at 1217.
190. Id.
191. No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (WD. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
192. Id. at *3 (citing Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)).
193. 535 F3d 1058, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (FletcherJ., dissenting) (emphasis removed)
(quoting Bryan v. Gomez, 46 E3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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C. Limiting What is a Sacred Site
In adopting intermediate scrutiny to review governmental actions
jeopardizing sacred sites, I hope to appease some critics who will argue
that Native Americans should not be allowed to use religion to reclaim
control over an unlimited amount of land that was taken from them
throughout history. This is another version of the argument made by
some that to the Indians, the whole earth is sacred and if we allow one
claim, the floodgates will be open and there will be no end to claims of
sacredness.'94 As one prominent scholar aptly put it, "[b]ehind every free
exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each
judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption
demands from religious deviants of every stripe."195 Similar concerns were
certainly evident in Justice O'Connor's Lyng opinion when she stated the
following after remarking that the Indian practitioners did not at the time
object to the area being used by others:
[n]othing in the principle for which they contend, however,
would distinguish this case from another lawsuit in which they
(or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude
all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the pub-
lic lands .... No disrespect for these practices is implied when
one notes that such beliefs could easily require defacto benefi-
cial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public
property.'96
The same issue arose in Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service
where the en banc majority stated, "[i]n the Cococino National Forest
alone, there are approximately a dozen mountains recognized as sacred
by American Indian tribes .... New sacred areas are continuously being
recognized by the Plaintiffs."' In other words, once you acknowledge
that disturbance of sacred sites can impose a substantial burden on Na-
tive religious practitioners there is no stopping place, because virtually
everything is sacred. To this argument, Judge Fletcher in his dissenting
opinion argued that to the Indians, there were degrees of sacredness.'99
Thus, he attempted to distinguish "sacred" places from truly sacred or
"holy" places.'99
194. See, e.g.,Yablon, supra note 5, at 1630-33.
195. Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 18, at 947.
196. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988).
197. 535 F3d 1058, 1066 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008).
198. Id. at 1097-98 (FletcherJ., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1098 ("But while there are many mountains within [the tribes'] historic
territory, only a few of these mountains are 'holy' or particularly 'sacred.'").
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Although appeasing this fear is important, most Native American re-
ligious practitioners seem reluctant to precisely define sacred sites.2 0 Yet
definitions of "sacred" have surfaced in other legislation and official gov-
ernmental documents. The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act,201 for instance, defined "sacred objects" as "specific cer-
emonial objects which are needed by traditional Native American
religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions
by their present day adherents."202 In Executive Order 13007, "sacred site"
is defined to mean "any specific, discrete, narrowly delineated location on
federal land that is identified by an Indian tribe, or Indian individual de-
termined to be an appropriately authoritative representative of an Indian
religion, as sacred by virtue of its established religious significance to, or
ceremonial use by, an Indian religion."203
Defining what a sacred site is can also be informed by evaluating the
implementation of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),20'
which was amended in 1992 to allow inclusion of "Traditional Cultural
Properties" (TCPs) on the National Register of Historic Places.TCPs are
defined in the Act as "properties of traditional religious and cultural im-
portance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian Organization." 0 1 The
National Park Service has issued guidelines further defining TCPs as
property associated "with cultural practices or beliefs of a living commu-
nity that (a) are rooted in that community's history, and (b) are important
in maintaining the continuing cultural identity of the community." 206
der the Act, federal agencies considering a federal "undertaking" must first
identify tribes with potentially impacted TCPs,207 consult with such af-
fected Indian tribes,2 08 and develop alternatives aimed at minimizing
200. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F Supp. 1471, 1496, 1499 (D. Ariz.
1990); see also Ethan Plaut, Comment, Tribal-Agency Confidentiality: A Catch-22 for Sacred
Site Management?, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 137, 138, 143-46 (2009).
201. 25 U.S.C. %§ 3001-3013 (2006).
202. Id. § 3001(3)(C).
203. Exec. Order No. 13,007,61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).The Order, signed
by President Clinton on May 24, 1996, aimed to facilitate access to sacred sites by Indian
religious practitioners. Id.
204. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §5 470 to
470x-6 (2006)).
205. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A) (2006); 36 C.FR. § 800.16(1)(1) (2004).
206. PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS F. KING, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN: GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND Docu-
MENTING CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1 (1990).
207. See Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F3d 856, 861-62 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the Forest Service had not conducted a reasonable investigation to identify
TCPs).
208. See Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F3d 768, 787 (9th Cir. 2006) (find-
ing that the federal agency had not adequately consulted with the tribe).
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potential adverse effects on TCPs.209 For the purpose of this Article it is
important to note, however, that the NHPA is only a consultation statute
and that federal agencies can still proceed with federal undertakings after
such tribal consultations even if they result in adverse effects on the
TCPs.2 10
A previous attempt at a legislative solution, the Native American Sa-
cred Lands Act, introduced by Congressman Rahall in 2002, defined
sacred lands" to mean:
any geophysical or geographical area or feature which is sacred
by virtue of its traditional culture or religious significance or
ceremonial use, or by virtue of a ceremonial or cultural re-
quirement, including a religious requirement that a natural
substance or product for use in Indian tribal or Native Hawai-
ian organization ceremonies be gathered from that particular
location. 2 11
For potential legislation to have any chance of passing, some rela-
tively manageable definition of sacred sites should be included in the
proposal. 212 Although some commentators have argued for a very general
definition, 213 it will ultimately be hard not to narrow down sacred sites to
those areas that are truly important or holy to Native practitioners as was
suggested by Judge Fletcher in his Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Ser-
vice dissenting opinion. This Article does not argue that only those sacred
sites that are "central" to a religion should be protected. The concept of
centrality has been criticized,2 1 ' and was discarded by Justice Scalia in his
Smith majority opinion. However, the definitions contained in Executive
Order 13007, Bulletin 38 of the National Park Service relative to TCPs,
and Rahall's Native American Sacred Lands Act, are all fairly similar and
together provide an excellent starting point for discussion. Assembling the
209. See 36 C.ER. 9§ 800.4(b)(1), 800.6(a)-(b) (2011); see also Muckleshoot v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 177 E3d 800, 805-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that although the Forest Ser-
vice had made a good faith effort to identify TCPs, it failed in its obligation to minimize
the detrimental effects on TCPs).
210. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 E3d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir.
2005); see also, Charles Rennick, Comment, The National Historic Preservation Act: San Car-
los Apache v. United States and the Administrative Roadblock to Preserving Native American
Culture, 41 NEw ENG. L. REv. 67,80 (2006).
211. H.R. 5155, 107th Cong. § 1(b)(4) (2002).
212. For a good discussion of "What is a Holy Place" along with a list of the most
important Native American Sacred Sites, see ECHO-HAWK, supra note 1, at 329-33.
213. E.g., Amber L. McDonald, Secularizing the Sacrosanct: Defining "Sacred"for Native
American Sacred Sites Protection Legislation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 783 (2004) ("A sacred
site is one which is sacred to those practicing traditional native religions or is otherwise of
significance according to native tradition and includes any land that, under a law of the
United States is declared to be sacred to Native Americans.").
214. Id. at 762, 780.
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various concepts contained in these definitions, it is possible to narrow
down the essence of sacred sites as comprising three principal elements.
First, they have to be specific and delineated geographical areas located on
federal lands. Second, they have to be tied to ongoing traditional religious
practices or ceremonies. And third, these religious ceremonies have to be
important to the Indian religious community.
While it is true that Indian religions may have a somewhat different
emphasis on sacred sites,Walter Echo-Hawk remarked that the concept of
certain places as being holy is universal:
Across the world, there is a common human theme of seeking
direct spiritual contact at sacred geographical points. The holy
places form a rich tapestry where humans can experience di-
rect communication from God, divine beings, or spirits.215
Hopefully, the universality of this concept will help create a consensus for
defining sacred sites.
CONCLUSION
Sacred sites are vitally important to Native religious practitioners
and to the continuation of traditional Native culture. Unfortunately, the
reasons for which they are important have been poorly understood by
some courts, including the United States Supreme Court. Fearing endless
challenges to federal land management decisions, the Court in Lyng opted
for a definition of substantial burden that seemed to preclude First
Amendment protections for Native American religious practitioners.
Congress eventually enacted RFRA, which seems to allow courts to
adopt a different definition of substantial burden. Some courts, like the
Ninth Circuit, still take the position that Lyng precludes such a move. Alt-
hough good arguments can be made against this position, this Article has
shown that RFRA is full of ambiguities and that the adoption of strict
scrutiny in RFRA may have been a mistake. The Article therefore rec-
ommends the adoption of a new test for protection of sacred sites. The
essential elements of the new test are: First, the adoption of an intermedi-
ate type of scrutiny modeled along the lines of tests the Court has
formulated in some free speech cases. Second, the broadening of the
threshold element of burden beyond the coercion/denial of benefit test
and towards a substantial impact or disparate impact test that combines
the test suggested by Justice Brennan in his Lyng dissent and currently in
use in the Tenth Circuit with the test proposed by Professor Dorf. And
third, the adoption of a manageable definition of sacred sites. There is no
question that sites sacred to Native American religious practitioners need
215. ECHo-HAWK, supra note 1, at 329.
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some protection. All of these sites used to be on lands owned by the
tribes. Although this is no longer the case, these sites are essential not only
to the practice of Native religions but also to the continuing vitality of
tribal cultures. Not only are they essential to establishing a connection to
what Walter Echo-Hawk has aptly called the spirit world, they are also in
many ways what connects one generation of Native Americans to anoth-
er.216
216. See id. at 325-56.
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